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BUD T. STEVEN.SON AND JOHN
E. ALVERSON, co-partners doing
business under the firm name and
style of Stevenson & Alverson,
Plaintiffs,

No. &i)9

vs.
THE IND·U STRIAL
OF UTAH,

CONl~fiSSION

Defenda.nt.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
Respectfully submitted,
I-I. VAN DA~l, Jr.
Attorney for plaintiffs.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CO}IBIXED ~IETALS REDUCTION COMPANY, a corporation,
and
BUD T. STEVEN.SON AND JOHN
E. ALVERSON, co-partners doing
business under the firm name and
style of Stevenson & Alverson,
Plaintiffs,

No. 6319

'VS.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISISION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

This is an original proceeding to review a decision
of the Industrial Commission of Utah holding that the
plaintiffs, Bud T. Stevenson and John E. Alvers-on, and
all men employed by them, were employees of the plaintiff, Combined Metals Reduction Company, and affirm..
ing a decision of the Appeals Examiner of the Unem-
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ployment Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission, which ·affirmed two representative decisions
holding that the employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties, ~and denied the petitions of both
pa~ties th.a t the relationship be held to be one of landlord and tenant under a lease agreement.
There are no disputed facts; th·e record consists of
petition (Record pp. 7) by Stevenson and Alverson to
the Commission for adjudication of status, in which is
set out in full their previous letter to the Commission
(which remained unanswered) and in which is set out
also the lease agreement between them and Combined
Metals Reduction Company; the two representative decisions (Record pp. 1-3) the. one denying the prayer of
the petition and holding Stevenson and Alverson and all
their employees to be employees of Combined Metals
Reduction Company, the other being a holding and notice to the same effect purporting to require Combined
Metals Reduction Company to submit supplemental wage
information and to include therein the earnings of s-aid
Stevenson and Alverson and their employee~, and to pay
contributions or tax accordingly; separate notices of
app·eal by both parties to the Appeals Tribunal (Record
pp. 4-5) ; Transcript of evidence introduced before that
Tribunal, supplemented by Exhibit No. 1, the petition
of Stevenson and .Alverson, Exhibit No. 2, General
Safety Orders covering underground metal mining operations, issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah, Exhibit No. 3, Handbook description of leasing system in
gener·al, Exhibit No.4, Statement by Col. Fleming, Wage
2
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and Hours Adn1inistrator relating to "hot ore" p·roduced in leasing operations, etc., and Exhibit No. 5,
sample settlement sheets; decision by the Appeals Referee (Record pp. 12-16) ; notice of appeal to the Industrial Commission (Record pp. 18-19) ; notice to the parties of affirmation of the decision by the Commission
(Record pp. 23) ; petition by both parties to this Court
for Writ of Review (Record pp. 29-31); and Writ of Review (Record pp. 32-33).
Combined Metals Reduction Company will hereinafter be referred to as ''lessor'' and Stevenson and Alverson as ''lessees''.
Since the record is not voluminous, and there is no
dispute about the facts, only a brief statement of the
facts will be necessary at this time.
Stevenson and Alverson formed a partnership to
engage in business for themselves, and on Jun·e 9, 1938,
entered into a lease agreement with ~combined Metals
Reduction Company; they did about six months' development, or dead work, during which time the Comp-any
loaned them money; in December, 1938, they struck ore,
and in January, 1939, they hired several men to take
out the deposit they had found; they applied for and
received employer's numbers with the Utah State Unemployment Division and the F'ederal s.ocial Security Division, and during the year paid contributions or tax on
a payroll in excess of $8;600.00 ; they paid back to the
lessor all moneys loaned; kept their own books of account; paid their exp·enses, and bought machinery and
equipment to carry on their operations; they hired and
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fired men at their own discretion and without consulting Company officials, and they were not supervised or
directed by Company officials in any \\Tay in carrying
on their operations.
The decision, rested in entirety upon construction
of the lease agreement, briefly stated, holds( a) That the contract required a personal
service of the lessees. This is bottomed on the
following expression in the lease-'' The lessee
agrees . . . to personally supervise the work and
assist in the performance thereof... ''
(b) The provisions of Sec. 19 ( j) (5) (a)
have not been complied with in that "direction
and control (were) reserved by the Company in
the contract''.
(c) That the s·ervices were not performed
outside of all the places of business of the Company.
(d) That the lessees were not customarily
engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business.
The petition for Writ of Review raises the following
questions, as therein stated:
(a) That the conclusion reached that Stevenson and Alverson are not employers but are
performing services in employment for ·Combined
Metals Reduction Company is not supported by
the facts and is contrary to law.
(b) A judicial question is involved, the determination of which is outside and beyond the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.
(c) That Sec. 19 (j) Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law ('Ch 1 Special Session 1936,
Amd Ch 43, 1937 and Ch 52, 1939) is invalid
4
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under Sec. 23, .L\rt. VI, Constitution of Utah, as
to title of amendatory acts.
(d) Also that said Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law is violative of Federal and
State Constitutions, as unreasonably depriving
parties of the right to contract.
All of these prop.ositions will be relied upon by
lessor ; only (a) and (d) by the lessees.
What we present here is not to be taken as criticism
of the Industrial Commission or any of its personnel;
our contacts with them indicate they are anxious to arrive at a correct solution of the perplexing situation
now confronting mine operators and those individuals
who desire to be something more than wage earners
and who have the initiative to try to establish themselves
in business. And this case is brought here, and is to
be considered by the Court, as much in the interest of
the latter as the former class. Rightly understood mine
leasing is a co-operative effort between the owner and
the lessee to bring about the production of met~als that
cannot otherwise be produced, and for their mutual
profit and advantage. So understood, the interests of
one are the interests of the other.
The aims and purposes of the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Act, The Federal Social Security Acts,
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 were ben·eficent.
When the application of those acts to an industrial
activity results in stopping that activity, and in putting
on to relief rolls something like 1200 families in this
state who had theretofore been sup·ported by honest
5
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labor in a gainful occupation, the beneficent purposes
seem to have been thwarted; and that suggests an inquiry
whether such application is necessary under the laws.
''Leasing Operations'' have played a very important role in the development of our mineral resources ; many larg,e and responsible mining operations
of today began under leases embodying the same elements as are involved in the lease under consideration
in the case at bar.
Since the decision by this. court in the National
Tunnel and Mines Company case the Department of
Placement and Unemployment Insurance of the Industrial Commission has held that the rules there laid down
must be applied to all mining leases, and that the lessees
must be held to be employees of the lessor; and the
reason for discussing in this connection the Federal Social Security act and rulings and the Wage and Hour
('Fair Labor Standards Act) and the rulings is that
those rulings seem to stem from or justify under the
mentioned decision. True the application has been relaxed somewhat to permit exemption of so-called '' isolated leases" as distinguished from "block leases".
Perhaps the statement made by the Wage and Hour
Administrator in his speech at Salt Lake City, October
30, 1940, best shows what is meant by this.
Colonel Fleming said:
"Perhaps we have received more inquiries
relative to the status of lessees in metal mining
than about any other one thing. Obviously we
cannot do what some have hoped we would do,
\Vhich is to say in advance that we '\\rill recognize
6
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certain types of leases as valid, in the sense that
" . . e will consider those who hold them to be independent operators as to whose wages and
working hours the lessor has no legal responsibility. In July, I announced a determination,
made at the request of metal mine operators in
these intermountain States, in which I said about
all it is possible for me to say on the subject. I
may as well repeat it. I stated that each case
must be determined on its- particular facts, with
primary importance given to the terms of each
individual lease agreement and the method of
operation under such agreement. If under the
lease agreement control and .supervision over
the operations of the so-called lessee are reserved
to the lessor, such lease agreement embodies the
normal incidents of the employer-employee relationship and the so-called lessees will he con·sidered as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
"On the other hand, if a particular lessee is
operating property which is not a part of the
property currently being op-erated by the mining
company with regular employees, and if in the
lease agreement the mining company does not
have the right to control the lessee in his operation of the mining property, it may well he that
the lessee is not an employee of the mine owner
but is in fact an independent operator of such
property.... (italics supplied)
"Two courts recently have held lessees of
mining property to be employees of the mine
owner. One of the cases was decided by the
Supreme Court of your own State under the
Utah Unemployment Compensation Act. Probably you are familiar with the case which is designated as 'National Tunnel and Mines Company
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v. Industrial 'Commission of Utah.' The other
decision was under the Fair L·abor Standards
Act and \\ras rendered by a Federal Judge in
Oregon as a result of the proceedings instituted
by the Division against the Cornucopia Mining
Company. In both eases the mining company
exercised complete control over the operations
performed by the lessees .... ''
The administrative agencies unde~ these acts seem
to be in agreement that the foregoing statement is correct. Summarizing the situation seems to he that:
(a) Where the lease agreement reserves
control and supervision of operations to the
lessor;
(b) Where, regardless of the lease agreement, the lessor exercises .control and supervision;
(c) Where, regardless of (a) or (b) it is a
so-called "block-lease",-i.e. ''is * * a part of the
property currently being operated by the mining company"',then the relationship of employer-employee exists, and
compliance with the acts is necessary. The application
of ·those rules stops about 90% of mine lease operations.
We do not, of course, suggest that responsibility for the
cessation of leasing operations rests upon this court,
or upon ·our Industrial Commission, or even upon our
Legislature. The Acts in their operation and effect
dove-tail and the rulings under one act are persuasive
as to ·the others.
It is believed that the record in this case presents
so different a picture of mine leasing and practice than
8
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the one the Court heretofore considered that the Court
Inay feel constrained to n1odify the rules already laid
do'vn or to distinguish this case.

1.

WH_A_T _..\_~fiNING LEASE IS.
A mining lease, in its elements and consequences,
is no different than any other lease. Under it the relationship of landlord and tenant is established, an estate
in the demised premises is conveyed to the lessee, he
is entitled to exercise dominion, for the time being, over
the premises, and to maintain action against anyone,
even the owner, who attempts to interfere with his possession. These are so elemental we think they need no
elaboration.
In the record (pp. 9) is to he found a general statement as to leasing operations and how they have hee~1
regarded by mining men for a long period of time.
The best treatment of mining leases from the legal
s-tandpoint that we have found is in Snyder on Mines,
Vol. 2, Section 1141, p. 932, to Section 1165, p. 9'53.
In Couch v. Welch (Utah, Nov. 13, 1901), 24 Utah 36,
66 Pac. 600, the Court says:
'' ... The contract contains essential characteristics of a lease. On its face it appears that
the lessors were 'desirous of leasing' as well as
selling the property. In the agreement they
'grant, lease and demise' 'the mining claims, fix
the terms of the lease, and provide for work to
be performed, which is to be 'not less than ninety
shifts' each month 'during the term of the lease'.
Rent is reserved by way of royalty, and its manner of payment stipulated. Forfeiture and sur9
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render of possession are provided for in the
event of a failure on the part of the lessees to
perform any of the covenants of the lease to be
performed by them. These are elements of a
lease. In fact an examination of the instrument
shows that the evident design of the lessors
was to lease the mining claims and grant to the
lessee the privilege to purchase them, and the
mere fact that the agreement also contains a
covenant granting the 'privilege of purchasing'
the demised premises does not destroy its char.acter as a lease. Nor is· such a covenant inimical
to the existence of the relation of landlord and
tenant betw·een the p·arties prior to the exercise
of the privilege.
18 AM & ENG Enc Law (2nd Ed.) 169; Clifford v. Gressinger, 96 Ga. 789, 2·2 SE 399;
Nobles v. McCarty, 61 Miss 456; Hartwell
v. Black, 48 Ill. 301; Barrett v. J ohns·on,
2 Ind. App. 25, 27 NE 983; Crinkley v.
Egerton, 113 NC 444, 18 SE 669; Holbrook
v. Chamberlain, 116 Mass. 155, 77 Am.
Rep. 146.
Nor does the fact that the contract provides for
the payment of royalty, instead of rent in money,
change the character of the instrument, or prevent the creation of the relation of landlord and
tenant. Rent may be n1ade payable otherwise
than in money, 2 Bl. ~comm. 41.
''We are of the opinion that the contract in
this case must he regarded as a lease, and that
the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties to this controversy.... ''
That case seems not to have been overruled, or the
doctrine of it departed from. And so far as we have
been able to discover there is no ease holding that a
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lease does not create the relation of landlord and tenant,
unless it be the one cited in Lindley on Mines, Sec. 861,
p. 2133, 'Yhere the author says: (@ p·. 2139)
''It has been held in California that a contract giving the right to work a mine for a certain time, the gross product to be equally divided
between the parties, is not a lease ; that such a
contract does not create the relation of landlord
and tenant, but fixes a rule of compensation for
services rendered, and is in all its essential features a contract for labor to be performed and
to be paid for by a share of the profits." (78)
Hudepohl v. Liberty Hill Cons. M. & W. Co.
80 Cal. 553, 22 Pac. 339; Stuart v. Adams,
89 Cal. 367, 26 Pac. 960.
And of the Hudepohl case, Judge Snyder says: Vol.
2, p. 945, 'But the California court, in order to uphold the contract and evade the shoals presented
by the statute of that state, held that where a
corporation agreed to lease to plaintiff for one
year the right to work and mine certain mining
ground, the gross product thereof t.o be divided
between plaintiff and defendant, it was not a
lease, but an agreement to work a mine. This
California case, however, is like some other
decisions from that state, one resulting from expediency merely, and not from the apparent law
of the case. ''
And in a later case the California court pointed
to the distinction between that case and a lease case,
Conner v. Garrett (Cal. 2-21-1924), 224 Pac. 786, @ p.
787"(2) Appellant contends that the instrument referred to herein as a lease was not such
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in fact but ":as 'a mere license to 'vork the mining property on a royalty basis.' The character of the instrument, for the purposes of
this case, seems to be unimportant .. If it be
called a lease, as in Northern Light Min. Co.
v. Blue Goose Min. Co., 25 Cal. App. 282, 143
Pac. 540, a license, as in Wheeler v. W·est, 71
Cal. 126, 11 Pac., 871; or a contract of employrnent as in Hudepohl v. Mining & Water Co.,
80 Cal. 553, 22 Pac. 339, the .result is the same."
We think, on the authority of the Utah case, cit.
sup, and general authority on the subject, the lease
here in question must be held to be a bona fide lease
transaction.
If this is the case, is there anything implicit in
the document that justified the decision that it calls
for personal service for wages, and thus changes its
character~
The decision on that point is rested on
the sole recital,-'' The lessee agrees . . . . to personally supervise the work and assist in the performance
thereof ... ''
That mining is a hazardous occupation justifying
elaborate police regulation, will not be disputed. But
it is surprising t.o learn that an owner who leases his
property and in the lease agreement provides for responsibility to attend the leasing operation, should
thereby change the entire character of the transaction.
We should think, rather, that the policy of the law
would be to encourage all owners of mining property
to see to it that only careful, competent and responsible men be permitted to lease their property. Moreover, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 19·38, requires

12
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that owners of mines who ship in interstate commerce
see to it that n·o '·'hot ore'' is included in their shipments; violation of the act in this resp·ect might suhjoot
the o'vner to a fine of $10,000.00 for a first offense, and
might result in an order restraining all his shipment
in interstate commerce.
"Hot ore" would be that produced where e. g.
minors were employed, where minimum wages were not
paid, or where men worked more than the hours speci.
fied in the act without payment of time: and a. half for
the overtime. The Utah law defines a shift in a mine
as eight hours, collar to collar, and prohibits the employment of minors. The Industrial Commission rules
and regulations provide elaborate police regulation for
all mining operations. The owner of a mine, and the
public are vitally interested, and surely there can be nc
impropriety in requiring that lessees ''personally supervise the work and assist in performance thereof.''
We think a reasonable construction of this contract will result in a holding that it creates a non-service relationship and that there is no occasion to consider the -a, b, and c, tests.
II. THE COMMISSION'S DE·CISION.
Two men formed a partnership and entered into a
written lea~e with a corporation, the owner of certajn
mining ground, by ·the terms of which they leased for
a period of three months a certain designated p·ortion
or block ·of such mining ground.
The Company did not know when they entered or
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left the ground or who or how many men they had
working for them, except as they monthly furnished
to the Company for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act a list of the men they had employed and
the time each had worked.
While the lease provided that they should not take
into the property anyone objectionable to the Company
this provision was in practice entirely disregarded and
the Company never knew in advance who was employed
by the lessees.
Before entering into this lease one of the partners
had done some leasing,- both were experienced miners.
For some time after the lease was entered into
they trammed their ore and waste to the surface except
where waste could be disposed of underground. Later
the Company installed an electric locomotive and
tramn1ed waste without charge to the lessees and ore
at a charge of about fifteen cents a ton less than it had
' the lessees to tram their own ore. The lessees
cost
were not required to make use of this service but did
use it because of the saving it meant to them.
There ~ras no supervision or direction of the work
of the lessees vvhatever. The only time representatives
of the Company ever entered the leased block of ground
was for purposes of acquiring geological data and to
determine that the lessees were working in the leased
ground and had not gone beyond its limits.
The lease originally taken was renewed from time
to time.
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For some six months after obtaining the first
lease the partners did development or dead work and
then they struck ore and hired several men to take
out the deposit they had found. During the year 19·39
their payroll-".,.ages paid to men employed by themexceeded $8,600.00. During the course of their work
they have accumulated and now own a substantial
amount of mining equipment and a motor truck.
The Industrial Commission has determined that
these two men so far from being engaged in business
on their own account, as they, with some seeming justice believed themselves to be, were, at least for the
purposes of the Utah Unemployment Compensation
Act, employees of the corporation from whom they
leased the mining ground which after six months development produced ore in such amounts as to occasion the expenditure of thousands of dollars in wages
to men whom they employed.
How did the Industrial Commission arrive at this
extraordinary conclusion~
The Industrial Commission merely affirmed the
decision of its Appeals Referee and the answer is to
be found in a paragraph headed "Comments"· appearing at the top of page 4 of the Opinion of such Referee.
This paragraph reads as follows:
"The statutory definition of 'employment'
contained in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law, quoted at the beginning of this
decision, requires that we first determine whether or not a service was performed for a wage
or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
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express or implied. In other decisions I have
interpreted the term 'service' to imply a personal service. In paragraph one of the contract under consideration, the Company obviously required a personal service of Stevenson and
Alverson. This paragraph reads in part as follows; 'The lessee agrees ... to personally supervise the work and assist in the performance
thereof . . . ' The remuneration of the nature
received by the lessees has been held by our
Supreme Court to constitute wages. See NATIONAL TUNNEL AND MINES CO'MPANY v.
INDUSTRIAL COM·MISSIO·N OF UTAH, 102 P.
2d 508. Our proper conclusion, therefore, is to
the effect that the lessees did perform a service
for a wage and, therefore, the (a), (b), and (c)
provisions of Section 19 (j) ( 5) will be applied
to the relationship to determine whether or not
it was one which constituted 'employment' subject to the provisions of the Utah Unemployment
Compensation Law.''
The Referee determined that the lessees performed
a personal service because,
' ' The lessee agrees . . . to personally supervise the work and assist in the performance
thereof ... ''
But the Referee did not stop to inquire 'vhether this
personal service was performed by the lessees for their
own account ·or for the account of someone else. On
the contrary, the Referee assumed that since personal
service was performed by the lessees it must have
been performed for the Company from whom they
leased the mining ground!
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''-rhy did the Referee make this assumption 1 Appa.rently because this Honorable Court in the cited
case had held that "remuneration of the nature received by the lessees ... constitute wages".
This is indeed reasoning in a circle. Before any
question of the receipt of wages is involved and independently thereof, it must be determined whether· services are performed '' f.or another''. The form in
which remuneration is received is not determinative of
whether services are being so rendered : ''Wages"' are
defined in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act
as all compensation payable for personal services rendered for another under a contract of hire, express
or implied. Any remuneration therefore, whatever its
form, may constitute wages if it is received for personal
services rendered for another. But remuneration, no
matter what its form, does not constitute wages if
received for personal service rendered for one's own
account and not for another. This obvious and fundamental fact the Appeals Referee entirely overlooked.
The point was clearly made by this Honorable
Court in its opinion in The Fuller Brush Company v.
Industrial Commission, 104 P. (2d) 201, at 204, where
this Court said:
"That claimant performed personal service
is not in dispute, but there is a dispute as to
whether such services were performed for plaintiff or for self, and as to whether he received
wages therefor or profits on sales. In other
w·ords, was the relationship between plaintiff
and claimant that of employer and employef\ or
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that of vendor and vendee~ The finding being
positive and definite that claimant in the performance of the personal service was free of all
direction and control by plaintiff, both in fact
and under his con tract of hire, it must follow of
necessity that he did not perform service for
plaintiff under a contract of hire or for wages,
and therefore the relationship was one that never
came within the scope of the act because he v:as
not in employment that would bring him within
the act, to wit, rendering personal services for
another under a contract of hire or for wages,
Since there was no obligation on plaintiff to pay
claimant any remuneration for services, but
claimant must get his remuneration, if any, from
his ability to sell the brushes at an advanced
price over the cost to him and that he and not
plaintiff assumed the risk of profit or loss on the
venture or undertaking, it follows claimant's
services were not rendered for wages or under
a contract of hire. The error came a b o u t
through a misinterpretation of the law, in holding that all personal services were within the_ act
unless excluded by the provisions of Sec. 19 (j)
( 5), -whereas only those personal services are
within the act which are rendered for another
for wages or under a contract of hire. As
pointed ·out above, Sec. 19 (j) (5) is an exception
provision, applying only after it has been determined that personal services were rendered for
another for wages or under a contract of hire.
It excepts from this class certain instances in
which the three conditions of that section all
are present.
''Since claimant never came within the act
as rendering personal service for another for
wages ·Or under a contract of hire, it is unneces-
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s-ary to consider '""hether he was customarily
engaged in an independently established business.''
Here, as in The Fuller Brush case, he who runs
may see that the relationship bet,Yeen the parties was
not that of employer and employee but that of lessor
and lessee ; that the lessees assumed the risk of profit
or loss on the undertaking; th·at there was no obligation on the lessor to pay the lessees any remuneration
for the services they rendered; that such services were
rendered by them for their own account and not for
the account of the lessor and therefore the remuneration which they received as a result of their success in
the mining operations conducted by them did not constitute wages, but profits.
There is no occasion to go further ; no occasion
to inquire as to whether, had the lessees been employees
of the lessor, they would have come within the provisions of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law;
to inquire as to the applicability of Section 19 (j) ( 5)
since as this Honorable C·ourt has pointed out, that
section becomes material only after it has been determined that personal services were rendered for another
for wages or under a contract of hi~re.
We shall, however, comment briefly upon the remaining section of the Appeals Referee's Opinion because in requesting a reconsideration by this Honorable
Court of the status of mine lessees, it seems desirable
to call attention to the processes of reasoning by which
the Administrative Agency supervising the Utah Un-
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employment Compensation Law utilizes Section 19 (j)
(5) as a sort of magic wand to bring every claimant
within the coverage of that law :
Having determined that two men who took a lease,
risked months of their time, finally struck ore, employed
other men, paid large wages and made a profit were
all the time employees of the company from which
they leased, the Appeals Referee is then concerned
with whether or not the "services" rendered by these
men for the lessor were (a) performed subject to the
lessor's direction and control, (b) performed outside of
all place's of business of the lessor, and (c) whether the
lessees 'vere customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business.
The Appeals Referee determined that the ''services performed for the company'' were performed subject to its direction or control. This the Appeals Referee did notwithstanding the uncontradicted testimony
that there was no direction or control of the work of
the lessees. The Appeals Referee arrived at this conclusion in this way: He said:
''The provisions of the contract indicate
that the Company did reserve a right of direction and control * * * ''. '' The agreement is one
of short duration and also provides for its ternlination by the Company upon thirty days'
notice. The Company could, if it desired, compel
the lessees to conduct their mining activities in
any manner pleasing to it!" '·'The contract provides that the work is to be performed in a
'good and miner-like fashion', and implies that
the Company could determine, if it so desired~
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what 'vould constitute a compliance with this
provision!''
Did anyone ever hear of a mining lease, whether
of a block of ground or a whole mining property, which
did not require that ""'"ork be done ''in a good and minerlike fashion" 1 Did anyone ever assume that a requirement that a certain standard be maintained constituted
a right to direct the manner in which the work should
be done, the results of which would meet such standard Y
Did anyone ever assume in the face of the admitted fact
that a lease had been renewed time after time and no
control had been exercised, that control was reserved
because the lease could be terminated on a short notice 7
The Appeals Referee then inquires as to whether
the work was performed outside of all places of business
of the company and concludes that it was not because :
''The rights of possession granted to the
lessees by the terms of the contract are so limited
that I am forced to say that the place at which
the service was performed by the lessees was a
place of business of the Company • * • * ''
The lease is in evidence and we respectfully submit that
whatever the .Appeals Referee may have been "forced"
to say, no lawyer would feel ''forced'' or even excused
for saying that the property covered by such lease remained a place of business of the lessor notwithstanding
the giving of the lease.
If the contract here is a bona fide lease it conveys_
an estate· in the property to the lessee and he thereafter has dominion over it. To say, that the lessor can
thereafter currently carry on operations in that prop.erty
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with its own employees, seems to involve a plain contradiction in terms ; and that is true whether the lease be
considered an "isolated" ·one or a so-called "block"'
lease. The lessee is operating, for the time being, in
his own property, and it cannot be any part of the place
of business of lessor mining company.
F'inally the Appeals Referee, having satisfied himself that the operations of the lessees in fact constituted
mere employment, that the ''services'' rendered by them
were subject to direction and control of the lessor, and
that the leased ground remained a place of business of
the lessor, says that it would be superflous to enter into
a lengthy discussion of the last provision of Section 19
(j) (5)' namely as to whether the lessees were customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business. He therefore merely
makes the statement that they in fact were not so engaged!
The record shows that these lessees formed a partnership on June 9, 1938 and entered into a lease with the
lessor; six months later they discovered ore. Throughon~ the year 1939 and the year 1940, up at· least until
the date of the hHaring in October, of that year, they
were engaged in operating leased property. Before the
first of these leases were taken one of the partners had
done leasing. How long must a man be engaged in some
line of work · before he is ''customarily'' engaged in
such line of work~ Does it matter that prior to two
and one-half years before the hearing one of these
lessees had already been engaged in leasing while the
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other one had not J? Certainly it would be strange if,
because of "~hat a man had done s·ome years in the
past, his present status should be held to be different
from that of another man presently engaged with the
first in an identical occupation. Certainly it would be
contrary to common sense and reason to hold that two
men \Yho had oYer more than tvYO years time engaged in
a successful business operation on their own account,
in the course of 'vhich they had employed many men
and paid out thousands of dollars in wages, had
accumulated a substantial amount of equipment, earned
and divided profits, were not customarily engaged in
an independently established occupation. We wonder
whether the Appeals Referee would hold that a man
elected for the first time to ·a public office was, during
the first term, customarily engaged in performing the
duties of such office or whether it would be necessary
for such man to be re-elected for a second or perhaps
·a third term before the Appeals Referee could feel that
he was customarily so engaged'

III. WHAT JURI~SDICTION, IF ANY, DOES THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSON HAVE OF . THE
QUESTION AS TO LIABILITY F·OR CONTRIBUTT·ONS BY ONE WHO CLAIMS NOT TO BE
WITHIN THE ACT~
On the authority of Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial Commission, 104 Pac. (2d) 201, we would say
that the repre~entative order (Record p. 3) requiring
Combined Metals Reduction Company to pay ~nto the
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Unemployment Compensation Fund the necessary contributions on wages earned by Stevenson and Alverson,
and their employees, is without validity.
If that means without validity for any purpose,
the question seems to he settled. But construed in
the light of previous expressions of members of the
court, it may only mean tha:t ·although the order is
without validity to compel payment at this time, it may
nevertheless be regarded as res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding by the State Tax Commission to collect the
contribution. And the Commission, as we understand,
takes the position that this is so, and that in a proceeding by the Tax Commission based upon a previous order
and demand by the Industrial Commission, the only
question involved would be whether either commission
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. It is important
that we know when we must make a defense on the
merits if we claim to have one.
The ques·tion is a judicial, not an administrative
one.
Industrial Commission v. Evans, 52 Utah 394,
174 Pac. 825.
And the rule there laid down has not been departed
from. MT. Justice Wolfe, in dissenting opinion, ~ogan
Cache Knitting Mills v. The Industrial Commission, 102
Pac. (2d) 495, said:
''In the following cases it was held that
questions on relationship of employer-employee,
number of employees, etc., are 'jurisdictional
faets' on which the appell·ate court will 'review
and weigh the evidence certified -in the record'
24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to determine whether Commission had jurisdiction. (Cases cited.) In these cases the Court
considered the evidence ane'v and determined
what conclusion should have been reached on
those facts and, on the basis of its conclusion,
affirn1ed or reversed.
''The Utah cases are to this effect: Ind.
Com. v. Evans, 52 Utah, 394, 174 Pac. 825; Hardman v. Ind. Com., 60 Utah 203, 207 Pac. 460;
Angel v. Ind. Com., 64 Utah, 105, 228 Pac., 509;
Norris v. Ind. Com., 90 Utah, 25,6, 61 Pac. (2nd)
413; Holt v. Ind. Com., 96 Utah 484, 87 Pac.
(2nd) 686. "
And the following excerpt is taken from Roberts v.
Industrial Commission (Utah, Aug. 15, 1939), 93 Pac.
(2d) 494 @ 495:
'·' * * * Each record of trial under this law
should be comp!ete in and of itself. Each element necessary to sustain an order by the tribunal
or commission, under this law, should be supported by testimony, exhibits, or stipulation,
introduced at the hearing. The rule is no different than that in industrial accidents. The
rule in the latter cases may be ·found in :Sp·encer
v. Industrial Commission et al, 81 Utah, 511, 20
Pac. (2nd) 618. The effect of failure to ap-ply
this rule is illustrated by this Roberts case.
Counsel for Roberts objects to the decision
upon the ground th·at there is no proof that
Roberts is such an employer-and as a matter
of fact there is no such proof. It has been assumed from other records. If properly before
us, we could p~ass upon the weight of the evidence in determining that que.stion. ''
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We should ·appreciate, and we are ,sure the Industrial Commission would app-re,ciate, an answer to these
questions:
1. Are the District Courts of thif? State
now without jurisdiction of a controversy between the Industrial Commission and one claiming not to be an employer~
2. Is an order of the Industrial Commission
requiring payment of contributions unqualifiedly
invalid~
·
3. That is to say, as we view it, does the
Industrial ·Commission have exclusive jurisdiction even of judicial questions, in the initial
stages~

IV. IS THE LAW C·ON~STITUTIONAL~
Plaintiffs question the constitutionality of Chapter 43, Session Laws of 1g.37, particularly S,ection 19
thereof, in that said purported amendatory act is in
conflict with Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution
of the State of Utah, which is as follows:
''Except general appropriation bills and bills
for the codification and general revision of
Laws, no bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject which shall be clearly expressed
in its: title."'
This Court has passed upon the following cases
under the Unemployment Compensation Law: Globe
Grain & Milling Company v. InduS'trial Commission,
No. 6050, ~1 Pac. 2nd, 512. Rehearing denied, 97 Pac.,
2nd, 582; Creameries of America, Inc., v. Industrial
Commission et al, No. 6093, 102 Pac., 2nd, 300; Salt
Lake Tribune Publishing ,Company v. Industrial Com-
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mission et al, No. 6114, 102 ~Pac., 2nd, 307; National
Tunnel & Mines Company v. Industrial Commission
et ·al, No. 6119, 102 Pac., 2nd, 508; Logan Cash Knitting
Mills v. Industrial Commission et al, No. 6130, 102 Pac.,
2nd, 495 ; Fulle-r Brush Company v. Industrial Commission, 104 Pac., 2nd, 201.
In the Globe Grain & Milling Company case it was
held that the Act did not restrict the benefits thereof
to those coming strictly within the common law concepts of servants or employees. This ruling is bottomed upon construction of Section 19 (J) (5) as employment is there defined in Chapter 43, Laws of 1937.
The rule has been followed in the subsequent cases.
No case has been decided by this Court involving any
definition other than the one in said Section 19. No
case has been decided by this Court jn regard to the
relationship existing between lessor and lessee under
the contract here involved based upon common law concepts of servants or employees or based upon the definition in Section 19, Chapter 1, Laws of Utah, 1936,
Special Session.
The title of the Act, said Chapter 43, in full is as
follows:
''Unemployment Compensation

An Act Repealing Section 22 of Chapter
1, Laws of Utah, 1936, Special Session, Relating to Approp;riations and Additional Salaries to Members of the Commission and
Amending Sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13,
and 19, Chapter 1, Laws of Utah, 1936, Special
Session, Relating to Unemployment Compensa-
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tion; Benefits; How Claims Shall be Made and
Determined; Rate and Pay of Contributions;
Establishment and Control of Unemployment
and Special Funds; the Administration of the
Act; Reciprocal Benefit Arrangements, Payment
of Members of Advisory Councils ; Making an
Appropriation; Defining Terms.''
The object of the constitutional provision (Section 23, Article VI) is stated by Judge Cooley in a
passage often quoted by the Courts to be :
''First to p·reven t hodge-podge or 'logrolling' legislation ; second, to prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and,
third, to fairly apprise the p·eople, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are
being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition
or otherwise, if they shall so desire.'' 1 Cooley's
'Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Chap. VI,
p. 296.
In discussing the mischief intended to be remedied
by this prov.ision, it is said in 1 Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, 2d ed., 184, No. 111:
''The failure to indicate in the title of the
bill the object intended to be accomplished by
the legislation often resulted in members voting
ignorantly for measures which they would not
knowingly have approved. And not only were
legislators thus misled, but the public also; so
that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed
through in the closing hours of a session, which,
having no merit to commend them, would have
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been made odius by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional cl·ause under
discussion is intended to correct these evils; to
prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures by confining each act to one
subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to
be expressed in the title.''
The rule is well stated by Mr. JuS'tice Sutherland
In Utah Power & Light Company v. Pfost. 286 U.S.
165; 76 L. Ed. 1038.
The Court passed on the question in Globe Grain &
Milling Company, cit sup. But in view that the decision was by a divided court, and that, .as stated in the
decision, no authority on the question had been presented to the Court, it would seem to be not amiss to
ask for a re-examination. The Court said:
'' ( 6, 7) Petitioner contends that a holding
as above makes the act unconstitutional as contravening fundamental law as contained in Article I, Section 7 (due process clause), Article
I, Section 18 (against impairing the obligations
of contract), Article VI, Section 23 (prohibiting
a bill from containing more than one subject)
of our State Constitution and A·rticle I, Section
X (imp,airing obligations of contract) and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, U . S.C.A. This formidable array of assertions of constitutionality is not sup·ported by
the citation of any authorities. If the contention
that the act did not clearly express in its title
the subject is good, the act is unconstitutional
regardless of whether we affirm or reverse the
commission's findings. But the title does not
29

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

offend in that regard. The subject in regard
to which the legislation pertains has been 'clearly
expressed in the title'. The subject is 'Unemployment Compensation'.
The constitutional
provision does not require that all the methods
prescribed in the act for carrying out its objects
be reflected in the title, nor all the classes affected by the act. There may be compensation
for some types of unemployed independent contractors, as known in the common law concept,
provided for in the act, which would be covered
by the subject 'Unemployment Compensation'."
91 Pac., 2nd, 516.
A case involving the same principle as in the case
at bar is Pet·roleum Lease Properties Company v. Huse,
80· Pac., 2nd, 774, decided June 22, 1938, by the Supreme
Court of Washington :
Section 19 of Article 2 of the Washington Constitution is as follows:
''No bill shall embrace more than one subject and ·that shall be expressed in the title."
At the ~937 session the legislature by its enactment amended the laws of 1923 defining the word '' security'' and in such enactment ·enlarged the definition
to include ''oil or gas leases, or any assignment, partial
assignment, agreement to assignment, or other ins·truments in connection therewith''. Headnotes Nos. 4 and
5 are as follows :
''4. Statutes-109
The constitutional requirement that act embrace but one subject expressed in title cannot
be met by amendment of definition in body of
act so as to give words· describing subject thereof
a meaning not attaching to them in common
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understanding without disclosing such special
meaning in title of act. Con st. art. 2, par. 19.
''5. Statutes-114 (7)
The act amending definition of word 'security' in body of Securities Act to include oil
or gas leases is unconstitutional as embodying
regulation of matter not within m~aning of word
'security' as commonly understood and defined
by original act without notice of such intent in
title. Laws 1937, p. 711, amending Laws 1923,
p. 207; par. 1, amending Laws 1923, p·. 207, par.
2; Const. art. 2, par. 19. ''
At page 77·6, the Court says :
"In Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal, 2d 110, 43
P. 2d 788, 794, 101 A.L.R. 871, the supreme
court of California, in discussing the natu·re of
these leases, says; 'Under the usual oil and gas
lease, the owner-lessor transfers to his lessee his
right to drill for and produce oil and other substances. The rights of the lessee present a clear
case of a profit a prendre in gross, a right to
remove a part of the substance of the land. If
the oil and gas lessee is not granted exclusiv-e
possession of the surface by the terms of the
lease, he has nevertheless a right to such possession as is necessary and convenient for the
exercise of the p-rofit, which, in fact, may preclude any other surface possession. This profit
a prendre vests in the lessee ali incorporeal hereditament, a present estate, an interest in the
land, which is a chattel real if it is to endure for
years.' "
And on page 777, the Court says:
''Now no one, whether of ordinary or superior intelligence, could discover from the title
of the amendatory act that it was intended to
31
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bring oil or gas leases within the operation of
the secu-rities act by defining them- to be securities."
and we submit that no one examining the title of the
amendatory act herein quoted, namely, said Chapter
43, could guess that the effect of such amendment would
be not only to extend the benefits of unemployment compensation to a large class not theretofore included in
the Act, but that liability for contributions would attach
as against a large class not prop·erly includable in
the term "employer" but whose liability whould be
created under the new definition, based upon contractual relationships which hitherto had never been considered as constituting the relationship of employer and
employee.
Judicial definitions extant in this State at the time
the Unemployment Compensation statute was enacted
distinguished between contracts of employment and
those of independent contractors:
Employer-Employee
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah, 430,
274 Pac., 940 (1929); Franksen v. Ind.
Com., 61 Utah, 354, 213 Pac., 197 (1923),;
Weber County-Ogden City Relief Committee v. Ind. Com., 71 Pac. (2nd) 177.
(Utah 1937) Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Ind.
Com., 40 Pac. (2nd) 183. (Utah 1935).
Independent Contractors:
Angel v. Ind. Com., 64 Utah, 105, 228 Pac.
509 (1924); Bingham City Corp. v. Ind.
Com,. 66 Utah, 390, 243 Pac., 113; Callahan v. Salt L~ake City, 41 Utah, 300, 125
Pac., 863. (1912) ; Dayton v. Free, 46
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Utah 277, 148 Pac., 408 (1914); Requa v.
Daly-Judge M. Co., 148 Pac., 448 (Utah
1915) ; S·tricker v. Ind. Com., 188 Pac.,
849 (Utah 1920); Ludlow v. Ind. Com., 235
Pac., 884 (Utah 1925); Gozoff v. Ind.
Com., 296 Pac., 29 (Utah 1931).
Certainly the legislature had these definitions in
mind in enacting our Unemployment Compensation law;
moreover, as we have pointed out, a bona fide lease
conferring upon the lessee an estate and dominion over
the property, should be in a higher bracket than an
independent contract. We think a lessee should at
least be classed as one of the most independent of
independent contractors.
Chapter 43, 1937, became effective March 18, 1937 ;
lessees registered as employers with the Conimission
about January, 1938, and paid their contributions on
payroll; not until August, 1940, did the Commission
change its mind about the construction of the statute,
when it offered to return to the lessees the amount
theretofore paid by them as contributions. If the Commission itself was misled as to the hidden meaning involved in this statute, certainly the public might he.
Now the Commision is attempting to collect from
Combined Metals Reduction Company contributions
based on the share of net proceeds production received
by the lessees and including wages paid by them to
their own employees.
Tested by the rules laid down in Fuller Brush
Company v. Industrial Commission, cit. sup., this would
seem not to be a service relationship at all; and if it
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is held to be such, then it would seem that the ti tie is
deficient and misleading, and the act clearly unconstitutional.
The lessees worked, it is true, for six months before they encountered ore; until that time they got no
remuneration for their labor; they worked when they
pleased, where they pleased, and how they pleased ;
except for the requirement in the contract that they
supervise the work and assist in performance, they
could do the work themselves, or hire employees to do
it. Certainly nothing can be pointed out that made the
lessor . in any way liable to them as for wages or any
other form of remuneration during that p·eriod.
How "did they get their compensation thereafter~
Upon severance of the ore from the freehold, such ore
became personal property, and they owned that property, the opinion of the Appeals Referee, notwithstanding. The mere fact that lessor and lessee agreed
upon a plan for marketing which assured both that the
highest market price would he paid for the· ore, subject to deduction of a more favorable treatment charge
than would be available to the lessees, could in no way
change this fact of ownership. (See testimony of Mr.
Young, Tr. pp. 5-15.) So as a rna tter of fact, lessees·
never did receive any remuneration from lessor, in the
form of wages for services performed, or in any other
form. Lessees paid to lessor a percentage of what was
received for the sale of ores as royalty or rental for
the premises so occupied by them.
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The amount involved in payment of contributions
under this particular lease is not large; multiply that
by the number of leases operated during the p·eriod by
Comoined Metals Reduction Company, and the net
returns from such leases, and the matter assumes some
importance. Then compute the net returns on leases
in the whole state for that period, and the contributions
\\'"hich under the theory of the Commission would be required, and it would seem to be a matter that justifies
a re-examination.
We respectfully submit that the facts in the case
at bar are parallel with the facts in the Washington
case and that the decided case has in it sound reasoning
and all the authority necessary to support the conclusion reached, and respectfully submit that Chapter 43,
Laws of 1937, and particularly Section 19 thereof,
being in conflict with our 'Constitution, should be declared invalid, and that the Court should determine the
relationship of lessor and lessee based upon common
law concepts and the definition of employment in Section 19, rChapter 1, S.pecial Session Laws of 1936.
We think the decision of the Industrial Commission
to be wrong, and therefore request that it be annulled;
in any event we submit our views in the hope they may
aid in clearing up a badly confused situation, which,
until it clears, is inimical to the interests of the State
and all its inhabitants.
Respectfully submitted,
H. VAN DAM, Jr.
.Attorney for p:laintiffs.
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